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Abstract: Ladder tournaments are widely used to rank individuals in real-world organizations
and games. Their mathematical properties however are still poorly understood. We formalize the
ranking rule generated by a ladder tournament, and we show that it is neither complete nor transitive
in general. If it is complete, then it is transitive and its asymmetric component is a finite union
of transitive tournaments. We also study the relationship between an individual’s rank and his
performance as measured by the frequency at which he is pivotal. We show an individual’s pivotability
is a weakly increasing function of his rank.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the mathematical properties of a game ladder involving a finite number of vertices
or players. Players are listed as if on the rungs of a ladder, and they compete against each other for
higher-ranked positions. Each player challenges each of the players above him on the ladder, and if
the lower-placed player wins, then the two players swap positions on the ladder. The game goes on
until no lower-placed player wins a challenge against a higher-placed player. This tournament model
is used in real-life organizations to make decisions on hiring, firing, and promotion.
We model a game ladder as a hierarchical organization (N,T, f) where N is a non-empty finite set
of vertices or players, T = {1, ..., j} an ordered finite set of position types with cardinility |T | = j ≥ 2,
and f : TN −→ R a real-valued production function measuring organizational performance. Positions
are ordered in degree of importance, where type 1 positions are less important than type 2 positions,
type 2 positions less important than type 3 position, and so on. We assume that the organization
is monotonic in that for any position profiles x = (x1, ..., xn) and z = (z1, ..., zn) such that x ≤ z,
f (x) ≤ f (z). In any position profile x = (x1, x2, .., xn) ∈ T
N , xi denotes the position of player i.
In a game ladder, players compete for more higher-level positions as follows. Consider two players
p and q in an organization. Player p occupies a position indexed s and player q occupies a position
indexed r, where s is a lower-level position than r. We say that p beats q in position r relative to
position s, denoted p (r,s) q, if aggregate output increases as a result of swapping p and q no matter
how the other members of the organization are allocated to the different positions. If p beats q in
each position relative to positions that are lower-ranked, we say that p is globally more influential
or productive than q, and this is denoted by p  q.
Our goal is to study some mathematical properties of the global influence relation . We find
that this relation is not transitive in general. However, if it is complete, it is transitive and its
asymmetric component ≻ is a finite union of transitive tournaments (that is, ≻ is a finite unions of
complete, asymmetric, and transitive binary relations).
We note that the global influence relation  coincides with the replacement relation introduced
by Isbell (1958) for games that have only two layers. However, the properties of  for games which
have more than two layers are quite different the properties of  for games that have only two layers.
In fact, when there are only two layers,  is transitive (see, e.g., Taylor and Zwicker (1999)), which
contrasts with the finding we obtain when there are more than two layers.
We also examine whether the relation  predicts the frequency with which a player is pivotal
in the game. The notion of pivotability was introduced by Freixas (2005b). We show that a more
globally influential player is (weakly) more likely to be pivotal.
The next section shows how the ranking rule  is generated through the game ladder. Section 3
studies its mathematical properties and concludes.
2 Ladder Tournament
A ladder tournament in a game (N,T, f) is a system of challenges that proceeds as follows. Let r
and s be two positions occupied by players p and q, respectively, where r is more important than
s. We say that p beats q in position r relative to position s, denoted by p (r,s) q, if swapping the
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two players decreases the aggregate output of the organization no matter how the other players are
allocated to the different positions. We say that p is globally more influential than q if p (r,s) q for
any positions s and r , and this is denoted by p  q. The binary relation  determines the global
ranking of the ladder tournament. The formal definition of each of these relations is below. We
denote by ep = (0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0) the pth unit n-component vector.
Definition 1 Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder, and p and q two players.
1) Let s and r be two tasks such that r > s. We say that p (r,s) q if: ∀x ∈ T
N such that
xp = xq = s, f(x+ (r − s)e
p) ≥ f(x+ (r − s)eq).
2) p is said to be more globally influential than q, denoted p  q, if: p (r,s) q for all s, r ∈ T
such that r > s.
The symmetric and asymmetric components of each relation (r,s) are denoted by ≻(r,s)and ∼(r,s),
respectively, and those of the relation  by ≻ and ∼, respectively.
We introduce the notion of a linear game ladder.
Definition 2 Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder. (N,T, f) is said to be linear if  is complete.
3 Properties
3.1 Completeness, Transitivity, Tournament
We show that the symmetric component of the relation  is an equivalence relation.
Proposition 1 Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder. The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Proof. 1) First, let us show that i  k.
Let s, r ∈ T such that r > s, and x ∈ TN such that xi = xk = s. Pose xj = t.
We need to show that f(x+ (r − s)ek) ≤ f(x+ (r − s)ei).
We denote by x∗ the following profile : x∗u =
{
xu if u 6= i, j, k
0 if u = i, j, k
It follows from this notation that x = x∗u+se
i+sek+tej and
{
x+ (r − s)ek = x∗ + sei + rek + tej
x+ (r − s)ei = x∗ + sek + rei + tej.
We distinguish five cases.
Case 1: Assume that t > r > s. Then,
f(x+ (r − s)ek) ≤ f(x∗ + sei + rej + tek) since k  j
≤ f(x∗ + sej + rei + tek) since i  j
≤ f(x∗ + sek + rei + tek) since j  k
= f(x+ (r − s)ei).
Case 2: Assume that t = r. Then,
f(x+ (r − s)ek) ≤ f(x∗ + sej + rek + tei) since i  j
≤ f(x∗ + sek + rei + tej) since j  k
= f(x+ (r − s)ei).
Case 3: Assume that r > t > s. Then,
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f(x+ (r − s)ek) ≤ f(x∗ + sei + rej + tek) since j  k
≤ f(x∗ + sej + rei + tek) since i  j
≤ f(x∗ + sek + rei + tej) since j  k
= f(x+ (r − s)ei).
Case 4: Assume that t = s. Then,
f(x+ (r − s)ek) ≤ f(x∗ + sei + rej + tek) since j  k
≤ f(x∗ + sej + rei + tek) since i  j
= f(x+ (r − s)ei).
Case 5: Assume that s < t. Then,
f(x+ (r − s)ek) ≤ f(x∗ + sei + rej + tek) since j  k
≤ f(x∗ + sej + rei + tek) since k  i
≤ f(x∗ + sek + rei + tej) since k  j
= f(x+ (r − s)ei).
2) k  i is proved in the same manner as the proof of i  k, and we conclude that i ∼ k.
Our second result says that the relation  is not complete in general, which implies that  is not
a tournament (a tournament is a binary relation that is complete and asymmetric).
Proposition 2 The relation  is not complete in general.
Proof. Consider the following game ladder where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, T = {1, 2, 3}, and f is
defined as follows:
For any profile x, f(x) =
{
1 if there exists y ∈ I such that x ≤ y
0 if not
where I = {(3, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2), (1, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2), (1, 2, 3, 1, 1, 2, 2)}.
It can be easily checked that 1 and 3 are not comparable.
Our third result says that the relation  is not transitive in general.
Proposition 3 The relation  is not transitive in general.
Proof. Consider the same game as in the proof of Proposition 2. It can be easily checked that 1 ≻ 2,
2 ≻ 3, but not(1 ≻ 3) given that 1 and 3 are not comparable.
Our fourth result states that the global influence relation  is transitive if  is complete.
Proposition 4 Let (N,T, f) be a linear game ladder. Then  is transitive.
Proof. Let (N,T, f) be a linear game ladder, and i, j and k be three players such that i  j and
j  k. We will show that i  k. We distinguish two cases.
1) Assume that not(k  i). Then i ≻ k since (N,T, f) is linear, and this implies that i  k.
2) Assume that k  i : we shall show that in this condition, k  i.
Let exist s, r ∈ T such that r > s, and x ∈ TN such that xi = xk = s. Pose xj = t.
We need to show that f(x+ (r − s)ek) ≤ f(x+ (r − s)ei).
As in Proposition 1, we denote by x∗ the profile such that x∗u =
{
xu if u 6= i, j, k
0 if u = i, j, k.
Then, x = x∗u + se
i + sek + tej and
{
x+ (r − s)ek = x∗ + sei + rek + tej
x+ (r − s)ei = x∗ + sek + rei + tej.
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We shall distinguish five cases as we did in Proposition 1.
Case 1: Assume t > r > s. Then,
f(x+ (r − s)ek) ≤ f(x∗ + sej + rek + tei) since i  j
≤ f(x∗ + sej + rei + tek) since k  i
≤ f(x∗ + sek + rei + tej) since j  k
= f(x+ (r − s)ei).
Case 2: Assume t = r. The proof is exactly as in Proposition 1.
Case 3: Assume r < t < s. The proof is exactly as in Proposition 1.
Case 4: Assume t = s. The proof is exactly as in Proposition 1.
Case 5: Assume s < t. Then,
f(x+ (r − s)ek) ≤ f(x∗ + sei + rej + tek) since j  k
≤ f(x∗ + sek + rej + tei) since k  i
≤ f(x∗ + sek + rei + tej) since i  j
= f(x+ (r − s)ei).
Our fifth result states that, if  is complete, then if a player i dominates another player j and
j is equivalent to another player k, then i dominates k. Also, if a player i is equivalent to another
player j and j dominates another player k, then i dominates k.
Proposition 5 Let (N,T, f) be a linear game ladder. If i ≻ j and j ∼ k, then i ≻ k. Also, if i ∼ j
and j ≻ k, then i ≻ k.
Proof. Let (N,T, f) be a linear game ladder. Let i, j and k be three players such that i ≻ j and
j ∼ k. It follows from what precedes that if not(i ≻ k) then k  i. But j  k and k  i imply j  i,
which is a contradiction with i ≻ j.
The second statement is proved similarly.
Our sixth result states that, if  is complete, then if a player i dominates another player j and
j dominates another player k, then i dominates k.
Proposition 6 Let (N,T, f) be a linear game ladder. Then, ≻ is transitve.
Proof. Assume that i ≻ j, j ≻ k and not(i ≻ k). Then k  i. Since k  i and i ≻ j, it follows that
k ≻ j, which contradicts j ≻ k.
It follows from Propositions 1-6 that  is not a transitive tournament in general. However, if  is
complete, then it is a complete preorder and its asymmetric component ≻ is transitive. This implies
that, if  is complete, then players can be partitioned into a finite number of layers where players
in the same layer are equivalent and players in each layer dominate those in lower-level layers. The
results also imply that, if  is complete, then ≻ is a finite union of transitive tournaments.
Theorem 1 Let (N,T, f) be a linear game ladder. Then  is a complete preorder and ≻ is a finite
union of tournaments.
Proof. The proof simply follows from the proofs of Propositions 1-6.
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3.2 Tournament Rank and Pivotability
In this section, we study the relationship between tournament rank, given by the relation , and
pivotability as defined by Freixas (2005a). Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder, and {z1, z2, ..., zk} the
range of f . Without loss of generality, we assume z1 > z2 > ... > zk. Denote by QN the set of all
the bijections defined from N onto {1, ..., n}. An element of QN is a possible order in which players
entire the game or the organization (players move from a type 1 task to another position type or
they stay in 1). An ordered allocation of positions of N is an ordered pair R =
(
sR, xR
)
, where
sR ∈ QN and x
R ∈ TN .
The i-pivotal player of R for i = 1, 2, ..., k− 1, denoted by i-piv(R, f), is uniquely defined either
as:
(a): the player whose action in R clinches the outcome of xR under at least the output level zi,
or
(b): the player whose action in R clinches the outcome of xR under at most the output level zi+1.
In other words, i-piv(R, f) is the first player in sR who satisfies one of the two following mutually
exclusive conditions:
(1) independently of how tasks are allocated among all subsequent players, the outcome will be
fh with fh ≥ fi, or
(2) no matter how all subsequent players were to change their actions, the final outcome would
be no greater than fi+1.
For every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k− 1}, denote by R+ip (f) the set of all the ordered allocation of positionss
for which player p is i-pivotal.
We answer the question of whether the frequency with which a player is pivotal reflects tourna-
ment rank. I
Theorem 2 Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder, and p, q ∈ N two players. Then, p  q =⇒
∣∣∣R+ip∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣R+iq∣∣∣
for any i ∈ {1, . . ., k − 1}.
The proof of Theorem 2 is quite involved and is presented in Section 3.3. This theorem proves
that a player’s pivotability is a weakly increasing function of his tournament rank, which justifies
the use of tournament in organizations.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2, a few definitions and five preliminary results will be needed.
3.3.1 Preliminary Definitions and Results for the Proof of Theorem 2
Let R =
(
sR, xR
)
be an ordered allocation of positions. Let p be a player. Rjp = (sR
j
p, xR
j
p) is the
ordered allocation of positions in which the order in which players enter the organization coincides
with that of R (i.e. sRjp = sR) and player p as well as any player q who enters before p occupies the
exact same position as in R (i.e. x
R
j
p
q = xRq if sR (q) ≤ sR (p)) whereas players who enter after p are
assigned the highest position (i.e. x
R
j
p
q = j if sR (q) > sR (p)). Similarly, R1p =
(
sR1p, x
R1p
)
is the
ordered allocation of positions in which the order in which players enter the organization coincides
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with that of R (i.e. sR1p = sR) and player p as well as any player q who enters before p occupies
the exact same position as in R (i.e. x
R1p
q = xRq if sR (q) ≤ sR (p)) whereas players who enter after
p are assigned the lowest position (i.e. x
R1p
q = 1 if sR (q) > sR (p)). These definitions are formalized
in Notation 1 below, where we also define the set of all ordered allocation of positionss in which a
player is pivotal.
Notation 1 Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder, R =
(
sR, xR
)
an ordered allocation of positions, and
p a player.
i) We denote by Rjp = (sR
j
p, xR
j
p) the ordered allocation of positions defined by:
sRjp = sR, and ∀q ∈ N, x
R
j
p
q =
{
xRq if sR (q) ≤ sR (p)
j if sR (q) > sR (p) .
ii) We denote by R1p =
(
sR1p, x
R1p
)
the ordered allocation of positions defined by:
sR1p = sR, and for all q ∈ N , x
R1p
q =
{
xRq if sR (q) ≤ sR (p)
1 if sR (q) > sR (p) .
iii) For any i = 1, 2, . . ., k− 1, R+ip (f) denotes the set of all the ordered allocation of positionss
for which player p is i-pivotal. We pose:
Rp (f) =
k−1⋃
i=1
R+ip (f) .
We also define the notion of agreement between two ordered allocations of positions. Let R =
(sR, xR) and R′ = (sR′, xR
′
) two ordered allocations of positions in a game ladder (N,T, f), and let
p be a player. We say that R and R′
agree up to the player p if the order in which the players enter is the same for R and R′ (i.e.
sR = sR′) and p as well as any player who enters before him occupies the same position in R
as in R′(i.e. x
R
j
p
q = xRq if sR (q) ≤ sR (p)). Formally, R and R
′ agree up to the player p if{
sR = sR′ and q ≤ sR (p)
xRq = x
R′
p for any q such that sR (q) ≤ sR (p) .
We denote by A (R, p) the set of all ordered allocations of positions which agree with R up to p.
The following remark is important.
Remark 1 Let R be an ordered allocation of positions. ∀R′ ∈ A (R, p), xR
j
p ≤ xR
′
and xR
′
≤ xR
1
p .
Denote by prec (p, sR) the player who enters the organization right before player p in an ordered
allocation of positions R. We remark that the definition of a i-pivotal player can be stated as follows:
A player p is i-pivotal in R if:


1) ∀R′ ∈ A (R, p) , f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi
2) sR (p) 6= 1⇒ ∃R′ ∈ A (R, prec (p, sR)) : f
(
xR
′
)
< zi
or 

1) ∀R′ ∈ A (R, p) , f
(
xR
′
)
< zi
2) sR (p) 6= 1⇒ ∃R′ ∈ A (R, prec (p, sR)) : f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi.
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The following lemma provides a full characterization of R+ip (f).
Lemma 1 Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder, p a player, R an ordered allocation of positions, and
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1} .
R ∈ R+ip (f)⇐⇒


f(xR
j
p) ≥ zi
f
(
xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )ep
)
< zi
or


f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi
f
(
xR
1
p + (1− x
R1p
p )ep
)
≥ zi.
Proof. =⇒) Suppose that R ∈ R+ip (f) and let us show the following:


f(xR
j
p) ≥ zi
f
(
xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )ep
)
< zi
or


f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi
f
(
xR
1
p + (1− x
R1p
p )ep
)
≥ zi
Two cases are possible : sR (p) 6= 1 and sR (p) = 1
Case 1 : sR (p) 6= 1.
• If


∀R′ ∈ A(R, p), f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi
∃R′ ∈ A(R, prec(p, sR)) : f
(
xR
′
)
< zi
then, given that Rjp ∈ A (R, p), we have
f
(
xR
j
p
)
≥ zi.
Let the ordered allocation of positions R1 =
(
sR1, x
R1
)
be such that
sR1 = sR
and
xR1 = xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )e
p.
We have sR1 = sR = sR
′. In addition, xR1 ≤ xR
′
by definition of R1 and R
′. Therefore,
f(xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )e
p) ≤ f(xR
′
) < zi.
• If


∀R′ ∈ A (R, p) , f
(
xR
′
)
< zi
∃R′ ∈ A (R, prec (p, sR)) : f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi
then, given that R1p ∈ A (R, p) , we have
f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi.
Let the ordered allocation of positions R2 =
(
sR2, x
R2
)
be such that
sR2 = sR
and
xR2 = xR
1
p + (1− x
R1p
p )e
p.
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We have, by definition of R2 and R
′
sR2 = sR = sR
′ and xR
′
≤ xR2 .
It follows that
f(xR
1
p + (1− x
R1p
p )e
p) ≥ f(xR
′
) ≥ zi.
Case 2 : sR (p) = 1.
• If ∀R′ ∈ A (R, p) , f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi, then R
j
p ∈ A (R, p) , and we have
f(xR
j
p) ≥ z.
We know that there exists a task profile x such that f (x) = zk.
Suppose that f(xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )ep) ≥ zi. Given that for any y ∈ T
N , the following inequality
holds
xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )e
p ≤ y
it follows that
xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )e
p ≤ x
and by monotonicity, we have
f(xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )e
p) ≤ f (x) = zk.
Therefore, zk ≥ zi, which is contradictory since zi > zk. We conclude that
f(xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
• If ∀R′ ∈ A (R, p), f
(
xR
′
)
< zi, then, given that R
1
p ∈ A (R, p) , we have
f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi.
We know that there exists a task profile x such that f (x) = z1.
Suppose that f(xR
1
p+(1−x
R1p
p )ep) < zi. Then, given that for any y ∈ T
N , the following inequality
holds
y ≤ xR
1
p + (1− x
R1p
p )e
p
we have
x ≤ xR
1
p + (1 − x
R1p
p )e
p
and by monotonicity,
z1 = f (x) ≤ f(x
R1p + (1− x
R1p
p )e
p).
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That is,
f(xR
1
p + (j − x
R1p
p )e
p) ≥ z1.
And therefore, we have z1 < zi, which is contradictory since z1 ≥ zi. Hence
f(xR
1
p + (j − x
R1p
p )e
p) ≥ zi.
We conclude that
{
f(xR
j
p) ≥ zi
f(xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )ep) < zi
or


f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi
f
(
xR
1
p + (j − x
R1p
p )ep
)
≥ zi.
⇐=) Conversely, assume
{
f(xR
j
p) ≥ zi
f(xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )ep) < zi
or


f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi
f
(
xR
1
p + (j − x
R1p
p )ep
)
≥ zi
and
let us show that R ∈ R+ip (f).
We shall consider two cases : sR (p) 6= 1 and sR (p) = 1.
Case 1: sR (p) 6= 1.
Let us show that 

∀R′ ∈ A (R, p) , f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi
∃R′ ∈ A (R, prec (p, sR)) : f
(
xR
′
)
< zi
or 

∀R′ ∈ A (R, p) , f
(
xR
′
)
< zi
∃R′ ∈ A (R, prec (p, sR)) : f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi
• If
{
f(xR
j
p) ≥ zi
f(xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )ep) < zi
, then, since for all R′ ∈ A (R, p), we have
xR
j
p ≤ xR
′
andf(xR
j
p) ≥ zi
and by monotonicity,
f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi, ∀R
′ ∈ A (R, p) .
Pose R′ = (sR′, xR
′
) with sR′ = sR and xR
′
= xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )ep.
We have
R′ ∈ A (R, prec (p, sR)) and f(xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
Hence 

∀R′ ∈ A (R, p) , f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi
∃R′ ∈ A (R, prec (p, sR)) : f
(
xR
′
)
< zi.
.
• If

 f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi
f(xR
1
p + (1− x
R1p
p )ep) ≥ zi
, then since for all R′ ∈ A (R, p), we have , it follows by
monotonicity that .
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xR
′
≤ xR
1
p and f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi
it follows by monotonicity that
f
(
xR
′
)
< zi,∀R
′ ∈ A (R, p) .
Let us find R′ ∈ A (R, prec (p, sR)) such that
f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi.
It suffices to consider R′ = (sR′, xR
′
) with sR′ = sR and xR
′
= xR
1
p + (1− x
R1p
p )ep. This ends the
proof for Case 1.
Case 2: sR (p) = 1.
Let us show that ∀R′ ∈ A (R, p) , f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi or ∀R
′ ∈ A (R, p) , f
(
xR
′
)
< zi.
• If


f(xR
j
p) ≥ zi
f
(
xR
j
p + (j − x
R
j
p
p )ep
)
< zi
, since for all R′ ∈ A (R, p), we have
xR
j
p ≤ xR
′
and f(xR
j
p) ≥ zi.
It follows by monotonicity that:
f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi, ∀R
′ ∈ A (R, p) .
• If


f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi
f
(
xR
1
p + (1− x
R1p
p )ep
)
≥ zi
, since for all R′ ∈ A (R, p), we have
xR
′
≤ xR
1
p and f
(
xR
1
p
)
< zi.
It follows by monotonicity that
f
(
xR
′
)
< zi, ∀R
′ ∈ A (R, p) .
We deduce that for all R′ ∈ A (R, p),
f
(
xR
′
)
≥ zi or f
(
xR
′
)
< zi.
We therefore conclude that R ∈ R+ip (f).
The following notation is useful.
Notation 2 Let R =
(
sR, xR
)
be an ordered allocation of positions. We denote respectively by Rpq
and R0pq the following ordered allocation of positionss:
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1)


sRpq (p) = sR (q) ; sRpq (q) = sR (p) and sRpq (a) = sR (a) for all a /∈ {p, q}
and
xRpq = xR + (xRq − x
R
p )e
p + (xRp − x
R
q )e
q
2)


sR0pq (p) = sR (q) ; sR
0
pq (q) = sR (p) and sR
0
pq (a) = sR (a) for all a /∈ {p, q}
and
xR
0
pq = xR
We have the following remark.
Remark 2 Let R =
(
sR, xR
)
be an ordered allocation of positions, p, q ∈ N : xRp = r and s = x
R
q .
1) If sR (p) < sR (q), then,
xRpq = xR + (xRq − x
R
p )e
p + (xRp − x
R
q )e
q
xR
j
q = x
(R0pq)
j
p
xR
1
q = x
(R0pq)
1
p.
2) If sR (p) < sR (q), then,
xR
j
q + (x
R
j
q
q − x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (x
R
j
q
p − x
R
j
q
q )e
q = x(Rpq)
j
p
xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (j − x
R
j
q
p )e
p = x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p
xR
1
q + (x
R1q
q − x
R1q
p )e
p + (x
R1q
p − x
R1q
q )e
q = x(Rpq)
1
p
xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q + (1− x
R1q
p )e
p = x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p.
3) If sR (p) > sR (q), then
x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p = xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q
xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (s − x
R
j
q
p )e
p = x(Rpq)
j
p
x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p = xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q
xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p = x(Rpq)
1
p.
The following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 2 Let (N,T f) be a game ladder, and p, q ∈ N two players. If R and R′ are two ordered
allocation of positionss such that R 6= R′, then R0pq 6= R
′0
pq and Rpq 6= R
′
pq.
Lemmas 4 and 5 below will also be useful.
Lemma 3 Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder, p, q ∈ N two players such that p  q, and R =
(
sR, xR
)
an ordered allocation of positions such that R ∈ R+iq (f), f(x
R
j
q) ≥ zi and
f(xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )eq) < zi.
1) If sR (p) < sR (q) and xRp > x
R
q , then Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f) .
2) If sR (p) > sR (q), then Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f).
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Proof. 1) Suppose that sR (p) < sR (q) and xRp = r > s = x
R
q . Let us show that Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f), that
is:


f(x(Rpq)
j
p) ≥ zi
f
(
x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )ep
)
< zi
or

 f(x
(Rpq)
1
p) < zi
f(x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )ep) ≥ zi
Since
p  q and x
R
j
q
p > x
R
j
q
q
it follows that:
f
(
xR
j
q + (x
R
j
q
q − x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (x
R
j
q
p − x
R
j
q
q )e
q
)
≥ f(xR
j
q) ≥ zi.
But
xR
j
q + (x
R
j
q
q − x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (x
R
j
q
p − x
R
j
q
q )e
q = x(Rpq)
j
p .
Hence
f(x(Rpq)
j
p) ≥ zi.
Let us show that f
(
x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )ep
)
< zi.
We have:
f(xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) < zi or f(x
R
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) ≥ zi.
• If f(xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )eq) < zi, since
xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q ≤ xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q
and
xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q = x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p.
it follows that:
f(x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p) = f(xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) ≤ f(xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) < zi.
Therefore:
f(x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
• If f(xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )eq) ≥ zi, since
xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q = xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (j − r)eq
it follows that
f(xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (j − r)eq) < zi
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because
f(xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) < zi.
We therefore have:
f(xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) > f(xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (j − r)eq).
Since p  q, we have
f(xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (j − x
R
j
q
p )e
q) < zi.
But
xR
j
q + (r − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (j − x
R
j
q
p )e
q = x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p.
Hence
f(x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
Therefore
f(x(Rpq)
j
p) ≥ zi and f(x
(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
We conclude that
Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f) .
2) Suppose that sR (p) > sR (q) and let us show that Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f). Il suffices to show that:
 f(x
(Rpq)
j
p) ≥ zi
f(x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )ep) < zi
.
By assumption, we have:
R ∈ R+iq (f) , f(x
R
j
q ) ≥ zi and f(x
R
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) < zi.
But
xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q ≤ xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (s− j)eq = xR
j
q
because
xRq = s.
Hence
f(xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (s − j)eq) = f(xR
j
q) ≥ zi > f(x
R
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q).
Since p  q, we have:
f(xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
q) ≥ f(xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (s− j)eq) ≥ zi.
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But
xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q + (s − x
R
j
q
p )e
q = x(Rpq)
j
p .
Hence
f(x(Rpq)
j
p) ≥ zi.
We have:
x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p = xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q.
Hence
f(x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi
as
f(xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) < zi.
We therefore have
f(x(Rpq)
j
p) ≥ zi and f(x
(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi
which implies:
Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f) .
We also have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder, p, q ∈ N two players such that p  q, and R =
(
sR, xR
)
an ordered allocation of positions such that R ∈ R+iq(f), f
(
xR
1
q
)
< zi and
f
(
xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )eq
)
≥ zi.
1) If sR (p) < sR (q) and xRp < x
R
q , then Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f).
2) If sR (p) > sR (q), then Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f).
Proof. 1) Suppose that sR (p) < sR (q) and xRp = r > s = x
R
q . Let us show that Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f), that
is:

 f(x
(Rpq)
j
p) ≥ zi
f(x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )ep) < zi
or

 f(x
(Rpq)
1
p) < zi
f(x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )ep) ≥ zi
Since p  q, it follows that:
f(xR
1
q + (x
R1q
p − x
R1q
q )e
q + (x
R1q
q − x
R
j
q
p )e
p) ≤ f
(
xR
1
q
)
< zi.
But:
xR
1
q + (x
R1q
p − x
R1q
q )e
q + (x
R1q
q − x
R
j
q
p )e
p = x(Rpq)
1
p .
So
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f(x(Rpq)
1
p) < zi.
Let us show that f(x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )ep) ≥ zi. We have
f(xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q) ≥ zi or f(x
R1q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q) < zi.
• Suppose f(xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )eq) ≥ zi. Since
xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q ≤ xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q + (1− x
R1q
p )e
q = x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p
or equivalently
zi ≤ f(x
R1q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q) ≤ f(xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q + (1− x
R1q
p )e
q) = f(x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p)
it follows that:
f(x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi.
• If f(xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )eq) < zi, since
xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q + (1− r)eq = xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q
we have
f(xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q + (1− r)eq) = f(xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q) ≥ zi > f(x
R1q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q).
That is
f(xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q + (1− r)eq) > f(xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q).
Since p  q, we have
f(xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q + (1− x
R1q
p )e
p) ≥ f(xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q + (1− r)eq) ≥ zi.
But
xR
1
q + (r − x
R1q
q )e
q + (t1 − x
R1q
p )e
p = x(Rpq)
1
p + (t1 − x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p.
Hence
f(x(Rpq)
1
p + (t1 − x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi.
We then have
f(x(Rpq)
1
p) < zi and f(x
(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi
which implies
Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f) .
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2) Suppose sR (p) > sR (q) and let us show that Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f), that is:
 f(x
(Rpq)
j
p) ≥ zi
f(x(Rpq)
j
p + (j − x
(Rpq)
j
p
p )ep) < zi
or

 f(x
(Rpq)
1
p) < zi
f(x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )ep) ≥ zi
By assumption, we have
R ∈ R+iq (f) , f
(
xR
1
q
)
< zi and f(x
R1q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q) ≥ zi.
But
xR
1
q = xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q + (s− 1)eq ≤ xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q.
So
f
(
xR
1
q
)
= f(xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q + (s− 1)eq) < zi ≤ f(x
R1q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q).
which implies
f(xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q) > f(xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q + (s− 1)eq).
Given that p  q, we have
f(xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p) ≤ f(xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q + (s − 1)eq) < zi.
But
f(xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q + (s − x
R1q
p )e
p) = x(Rpq)
1
p .
Hence
f(x(Rpq)
1
p) < zi.
We have
x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p = xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q
which implies
f(x(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi
because
f
(
xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q
)
≥ zi.
We then obtain that:
f(x(Rpq)
1
p) < zi and f(x
(Rpq)
1
p + (1− x
(Rpq)
1
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi
from which it follows that
Rpq ∈ R
+
ip (f) .
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In the sequel, given a ∈ N , i ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}, we define the following sets:
R+ia =
{
R = (sR, xR) ∈ R+ia :
(
f(xR
j
a) ≥ zi and
f(xR
j
a + (j − x
R1a
a )ea) < zi
)}
R−ia =

R = (sR, xR) ∈ R+ia :

 f
(
xR
1
a
)
< zi and
f(xR
j
a + (1− x
R1a
a )ea) ≥ zi




The following lemma is needed.
Lemma 5 Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder, p, q ∈ N two players such that p  q, and R an ordered
allocation of positions such that R ∈ R+iq, sR (p) < sR (q) .
1) If
{
R ∈ R+iq and
xRp ≤ x
R
q
or
{
R ∈ R+iq, x
R
p > x
R
q and
R′ =
(
sR, xR + (xRp − x
R
q )e
q + (xRq − x
R
p )e
p
)
∈ R+iq
then
R0pq ∈ R
+
ip.
2) If
{
R ∈ R−iq and
xRp ≥ x
R
q
or
{
R ∈ R−iq, x
R
p < x
R
q and
R′ =
(
sR, xR + (xRp − x
R
q )e
q + (xRq − x
R
p )e
p
)
∈ R−iq
then
R0pq ∈ R
−
ip.
Proof. Let (N,T, f) be a game ladder, p, q ∈ N and R an ordered allocation of positions such that
sR (p) < sR (q) and R ∈ R+iq.
1) Suppose
{
R ∈ R+iq
xRp = r ≤ s = x
R
q
and let us show that R0pq ∈ R
+
ip.
It suffices to show that: 
 f(x
(R0pq)
j
p) ≥ zi
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )ep) < zi
Since
xR
j
q = x
(R0pq)
j
p
it follows that
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p) ≥ zi
because
f(xR
j
q) ≥ zi.
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Let us show that
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
We have
f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p) ≥ zi or f(x
R
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p) < zi
with p and q being assigned to the same task s in the task profile xR
j
q + (s − x
R
j
q
p )ep.
• If f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )ep) ≥ zi, then, since
xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q ≤ xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q
by monotonicity, we have
f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) ≤ f(xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) < zi
which implies:
f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) < f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p).
Given that
p  q
and
f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) < f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p)
we have
f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (j − s)ep) ≤ f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (j − x
R
j
q
q )e
q) < zi.
But
xR
j
q + (s − x
R
j
q
p )e
p + (j − s)ep = xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
p )e
p = x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p
that is,
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
• If f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )ep) < zi, then, since
xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
p )e
p ≤ xR
j
q + (s − x
R
j
q
p )e
p
by monotonicity, we have
f(xR
j
q + (j − x
R
j
q
p )e
p) ≤ f(xR
j
q + (s− x
R
j
q
p )e
p) < zi
that is
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi
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because
xR
j
q = x
(R0pq)
j
p .
We then have
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
Therefore
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p) ≥ zi and f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
Hence
R0pq ∈ R
+
ip.
Suppose that
{
R ∈ R+iq, x
R
p = s > r = x
R
q and
R′ =
(
sR, xRp + (x
R
p − x
R
q )e
q + (xRq − x
R
p )e
p
)
∈ R+iq
and let us show that R0pq ∈
R+ip.
Since
x
(R0pq)
j
p = xR
j
q
we have
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p) ≥ zi
because
f(xR
j
q) ≥ zi
Let us show that f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )ep) < zi.
By monotonicity, we have
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi.
Since
xR
′j
q + (j − x
R
′j
q
q )e
q = x
(R0pq)
j
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
q )e
q
and
f(xR
′j
q + (j − x
R
′j
q
q )e
q) < zi
it follows that
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
q )e
q) < zi
or equivalently
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p) > f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
q )e
q)
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Given that p  q, we have
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
q )e
q) ≥ f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p + (j − r)ep),
that is,
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p + (j − r)ep) < zi
which implies
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi
because
x
(R0pq)
j
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p + (j − r)ep = x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p.
Therefore, we have
f(x
(R0pq)
j
p) ≥ zi and f(x
(R0pq)
j
p + (j − x
(R0pq)
j
p
p )e
p) < zi.
Hence
R0pq ∈ R
+
ip.
2) Suppose
{
R ∈ R−iq
xRp = r ≥ s = x
R
q
and let us show that R0pq ∈ R
+
ip.
Il suffices to show that 
 f(x
(R0pq)
1
p) < zi
f(x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )ep) ≥ zi.
Given that
xR
1
q = x
(R0pq)
1
p
we have
f(x
(R0pq)
1
p) < zi
because f
(
xR
1
q
)
< zi.
Let us show that f(x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )ep) ≥ zi.
We have
f(xR
1
q + (s − x
R1q
p )e
p) ≥ zi or f(x
R1q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p) < zi
with p and q being assigned to the task s in the task profile xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )ep.
• If f(xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )ep) ≥ zi, then, given that
xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p ≤ xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
p )e
p
by monotonicity, we have
f(xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
p )e
p) ≥ f(xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p) ≥ zi,
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that is,
f(xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
p )e
p) ≥ zi.
Since
xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
p )e
p = x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p
we deduce that
f(x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi.
• If f(xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )ep) < zi, then , since
xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q ≤ xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p = xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q
by monotonicity, we have
f(xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q) ≥ zi for f(x
R1q + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q) ≥ zi.
We therefore have:
f(xR
1
q + (s − x
R1q
p )e
p + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q) ≥ zi > f(x
R1q + (s − x
R1q
p )e
p);
in the task profile xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )ep, with p and q are assigned to the same task s.
Since p  q and
f(xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q) > f(xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p)
we have
f(xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p + (1− s)ep) ≥ f(xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p + (1− x
R1q
q )e
q) ≥ zi.
But
xR
1
q + (s − x
R1q
p )e
p + (1− s)ep = xR
1
q + (1− x
R1q
p )e
p = x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p
because
xR
1
q = x
(R0pq)
1
p .
That is,
f(x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi
because
f(xR
1
q + (s− x
R1q
p )e
p + (1− s)ep) ≥ zi.
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We therefore have
f(x
(R0pq)
1
p) < zi and f(x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi.
Hence
R0pq ∈ R
−
ip (f) .
Suppose
{
R ∈ R−iq, x
R
p = s < r = x
R
q and
R′ =
(
sR, xR + (xRp − x
R
q )e
q + (xRq − x
R
p )e
p
)
∈ R−iq
and let us show that R0pq ∈ R
−
ip.
Since
x
(R0pq)
1
p = xR
1
q
it follows that
f(x
(R0pq)
1
p) < zi
as
f
(
xR
1
q
)
< zi.
Let us show that f(x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )ep ≥ zi.
We have by monotonicity
f(x
(R0pq)
1
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p) < zi.
Since
xR
′1
q + (1− x
R′1q
q )e
q = x
(R0pq)
1
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
q )e
q
and
f(xR
′1
q + (1− x
R′1q
q )e
q) ≥ zi
we have
f
(
x
(R0pq)
1
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
q )e
q
)
≥ zi
that is,
f
(
x
(R0pq)
1
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
q )e
q
)
> f(x
(R0pq)
1
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p).
From p  q, we have
f
(
x
(R0pq)
1
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p + (1− r)ep
)
≥ f
(
x
(R0pq)
1
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
q )e
q
)
that is,
f
(
x
(R0pq)
1
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p + (1− r)ep
)
≥ zi
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which implies
f
(
x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p
)
≥ zi
because
x
(R0pq)
1
p + (r − x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p + (1− r)ep = x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p.
Therefore
f(x
(R0pq)
1
p) < zi and f(x
(R0pq)
1
p + (1− x
(R0pq)
1
p
p )e
p) ≥ zi.
Hence
R0pq ∈ R
−
ip.
For the sequel, for any p, q ∈ N , we define the following sets:
D+ipq =

R = (sR, xR) ∈ R+iq such that


R′ = (sR, xR + (xRp − x
R
q )e
q + (xRq − x
R
p )e
p) ∈ R+iq
and
xRp > x
R
q




D−ipq =

R = (sR, xR) ∈ R−iq such that


R′ = (sR, xR + (xRp − x
R
q )e
q + (xRq − x
R
p )e
p) ∈ R
and
xRp < x
R
q




3.3.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose that p  q and let us show that
∣∣∣R+ip∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣R+iq∣∣∣ for any i ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}.
Define the correspondence ψpq :R
+
iq −→R
+
ip which to anyR ∈R
+
iq associates an ordered allocation
of positions as follows:
R xRp < x
R
q x
R
p > x
R
q x
R
p = x
R
q
ψpq(R)


R0pq if R ∈ R
+
iq
R0pq if R ∈ D
−
ipq
Rpq if R /∈ R
+
iq ∪ D
−
ipq


R0pq if R ∈ R
−
iq
R0pq if R ∈ D
+
ipq
Rpq if R /∈ R
−
iq ∪ D
+
ipq
Rpq
The table above gives the value ψpq(R) of R depending on how x
R
p and x
R
q compare. We note
that ψpq is well defined. This indeed follows from Lemmas 2-5. Let now show that ψpq is injective.
Remark that for any R ∈ R+iq, it is the case that ψpq(R) ∈ {R
0
pq, Rpq}.
Let R, R′ ∈ R+iq such that R 6= R
′. Let us show that ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′).
• If sR 6= sR′, then sR0pq 6= sR
′0
pq, sR
0
pq 6= sR
′
pq, sRpq 6= sR
′0
pq and sRpq 6= sR
′
pq. It follows that
R0pq 6= R
′0
pq, R
0
pq 6= R
′
pq, Rpq 6= R
′0
pq, and Rpq 6= R
′
pq; hence ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′).
• If sR = sR′ and xR 6= xR
′
, we consider the following two cases:
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Case 1: There exists a player b ∈ N\ {p, q} such that xRb 6= x
R′
b .
Since x
R0pq
b
, x
Rpq
b
, x
R′0pq
b
and x
R′pq
b
are pairwise distinct, it is the case that
xR
0
pq 6= xR
′0
pq , xR
0
pq 6= xR
′
pqxRpq 6= xR
′0
pq and xRpq 6= xR
′
pq
which implies
R0pq 6= R
′0
pq, R
0
pq 6= R
′0
pq, Rpq 6= R
′0
pq, and Rpq 6= R
′
pq.
Hence
ψpq (R) 6= ψpq
(
R′
)
.
Case 2: For all player b ∈ N\ {p, q}, xRb = x
R′
b .
This case has three subcases i), ii) and iii) below.
i) If xRp = x
R′
p and x
R
q 6= x
R′
q , then R
0
pq 6= R
′0
pq and Rpq 6= R
′
pq.
• If xR
′
q = x
R
p , since
x
R0pq
q = x
R
q , x
R′pq
q = x
R′
p = x
R
p = x
R′
q 6= x
R
q , x
R′0pq
p = x
R′
p , and x
Rpq
p = x
R
q 6= x
R′
q = x
R
p = x
R′
p
it follows that
x
R0pq
q 6= x
R′pq
q and x
R′0pq
p 6= x
Rpq
p
that is,
R0pq 6= R
′
pq and R
′0
pq 6= Rpq.
If xRq = x
R
p , since
x
R0pq
p = x
R
p , x
R′pq
p = x
R′
q 6= x
R
q = x
R
p , x
R′0pq
q = x
R′
q and x
Rpq
q = x
R
p = x
R
q 6= x
R′
q
it follows that
x
R0pq
p 6= x
R′pq
p and x
R′0pq
q 6= x
Rpq
q
that is,
R0pq 6= R
′
pq and R
′0
pq 6= Rpq.
• If xR
′
q 6= x
R
p and x
R
q 6= x
R
p , then, given that
x
R0pq
p = x
R
p , x
R′pq
p = x
R′
q 6= x
R
p , x
R′0pq
q = x
R′
q and x
Rpq
q = x
R
p 6= x
R′
q
we have
x
R0pq
p 6= x
R′pq
p and x
R′0pq
q 6= x
Rpq
q
that is,
R0pq 6= R
′
pq and R
′0
pq 6= Rpq.
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ii) If xRp 6= x
R′
p and x
R
q = x
R′
q , following a similar reasoning as in a), we can show that R
0
pq 6= R
′0
pq,
Rpq 6= R
′
pq, R
0
pq 6= R
′
pq and R
′0
pq 6= Rpq.
iii) Suppose that xRp 6= x
R′
p and x
R
q 6= x
R′
q .
• If xRp 6= x
R′
q , then:
x
R0pq
p = xRp 6= x
R′
p = x
R′0pq
p , that is, R0pq 6= R
′0
pq;
x
R0pq
p = xRp 6= x
R′
q = x
R′pq
p , that is, R0pq 6= R
′
pq;
x
R′0pq
q = xR
′
q 6= x
R
p = x
Rpq
q , that is, R′0pq 6= Rpq;
x
Rpq
p = xRq 6= x
R′
q = x
R′pq
p , that is, R′pq 6= Rpq.
Similarly, if xRq 6= x
R′
p , we get the same conclusions.
• If xRp = x
R′
q and x
R
q = x
R′
p , then R
′ = (sR, xR +
(
xRq − x
R
p
)
ep +
(
xRp − x
R
q
)
eq),
R = (sR′, xR
′
+
(
xR
′
q − x
R′
p
)
ep +
(
xR
′
p − x
R′
q
)
eq) and R, R′ ∈ R+iq.
- Suppose that R, R′ ∈ Riq.
• If sR (p) < sR (q) and xRp < x
R
q , then x
R′
q < x
R′
p , and hence ψpq (R) = R
0
pq and ψpq (R
′) = R′0pq,
that is, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) because R0pq 6= R
′0
pq.
• If sR (p) < sR (q) and xRp > x
R
q , then x
R′
p < x
R′
q , and hence ψpq (R) = R
0
pq and ψpq (R
′) = R′0pq,
that is, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) because R0pq 6= R
′0
pq.
• If sR (p) > sR (q), then ψpq (R
′) = R′pq and ψpq (R) = Rpq, that is, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) since
Rpq 6= R
′
pq.
- Suppose that R, R′ ∈ R−iq.
• If sR (p) < sR (q) and xRp < x
R
q , then x
R′
q < x
R′
p , and hence ψpq (R) = R
0
pq and ψpq (R
′) = R′0pq,
that is, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) because R0pq 6= R
′0
pq.
• If sR (p) < sR (q) and xRp > x
R
q , then x
R′
p < x
R′
q , and hence ψpq (R) = R
0
pq and ψpq (R
′) = R′0pq,
which is equivalent to ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) because R0pq 6= R
′0
pq.
• If sR (p) > sR (q), then ψpq (R
′) = R′pq and ψpq (R) = Rpq, that is, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) because
Rpq 6= Rpq.
- Suppose that R ∈ R+iq, R
′ ∈ R−iq. Then, since p  q, we have x
R
p < x
R
q and x
R′
p > x
R′
q .
• If sR (p) < sR (q), then ψpq (R) = R
0
pq and ψpq (R
′) = R′0pq, that is, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) because
R0pq 6= R
′0
pq.
• If sR (p) > sR (q), then ψpq (R) = Rpq and ψpq (R
′) = R′pq, that is, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) because
Rpq 6= R
′
pq.
- Suppose that R ∈ R−iq, R
′ ∈ R+iq. Then, since p  q, we have x
R
p > x
R
q et x
R′
p < x
R′
q .
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• If sR (p) < sR (q) , then ψpq (R) = R
0
pq and ψpq (R
′) = R′0pq, that is, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) because
R0pq 6= R
′0
pq.
• If sR (p) > sR (q), then ψpq (R) = Rpq and ψpq (R
′) = R′pq, that is, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′) because
Rpq 6= R
′
pq.
We conclude that for any R, R′ ∈ R+iq such that R 6= R
′, ψpq (R) 6= ψpq (R
′), that is, ψpq is
injective, which implies that
∣∣∣R+ip∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣R+iq∣∣∣.
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